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II. BUSINESS AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY
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MILITARY OUTSOURCING IN POLAND:
LESSONS LEARNED AND PROSPECTS  
FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
Summary
The aim of the paper is to discuss the key issues of military outsourcing 
in Poland. Outlining the theoretical background, the article discusses the 
nature and scope of military outsourcing. Then the development of military 
outsourcing market is analysed. In its empirical part, the paper identifies the 
outcomes and lessons learned from the implementation of contracting-out 
program in the Polish Armed Forces. Finally it attempts to forecast prospects 
for the further development of military outsourcing. The contents of the paper 
are based on the critical analysis of available sources (books, articles, legal 
acts, the Internet) and the opinions presented by interviewed experts (the PAF 
flag and senior officers, academic researchers and branch journalists).
1. Introduction
The transformation undertaken by the armed forces in democratic states 
in the 1990s and 2000s resulted in the increase of the military outsourcing 
market and taking over by civilian contractors the roles traditionally performed 
by military personnel. This tendency is particularly prominent in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Although the value and the share of services 
outsourced by the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) is significantly lower in 
comparison with the aforementioned nations, the role of military outsourcing 
in Poland in recent years has been growing as well. This trend has been 
strengthened by the lessons Polish military decision makers learned from 
abroad operations (in particular Iraq, Afghanistan and peacekeeping missions in 
the Balkans), the PAF professionalization and the ongoing transformation of the 
military logistics system. In 2008, the Minister of National Defence officially 
approved the comprehensive program of services contracting-out in the PAF. 
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Nowadays, three years later the time has come to analyse lessons learned, to 
assess the first outcomes of the program and to discuss its further perspectives. 
The prospects and determinants of the military outsourcing development in 
Poland were the topic of the paper presented by the author during the 8th WSB-
NLU seminar in June 2009 (Lis 2009, p. 255-264). In the conclusion of the 
aforesaid article, the areas of further scientific exploration were outlined. The 
assumption was to study the problem from two different points of view: the 
customer’s perspective and the supplier’s perspective. The aim of this paper is 
to continue the research initiated two years ago and to explore the issues from 
the standpoint of the Polish Armed Forces. In order to achieve the above-stated 
aim the following operational objectives have been set:
• to outline the concept and scope of military outsourcing and the reasons 
for its development in order provide the theoretical background for the 
following empirical study,
• to analyse the issue of military market development in the countries 
known as leaders in military outsourcing implementation (the United 
States, the United Kingdom) and to review the literature presenting the 
lessons learned by those nations;
• to find out the outcomes and to assess (ex post) the effectiveness of 
projects implemented by the Polish Armed Forces in accordance with 
the MOD military contracting-out program dated as of 2008;
• to identify future opportunities and threats for the Polish Armed Forces 
resulting from outsourcing their in-home capabilities;
• to discuss the prospects for the further development of the Polish 
military outsourcing market;
• to identify the customer’s (the PAF) expectations concerning military 
outsourcing projects and relations with suppliers and the experts’ 
recommendations for military decision makers in order to improve 
military outsourcing management. 
The contents of the paper are based on the critical analysis of available 
sources (books, articles, legal acts, the Internet) and the opinions of interviewed 
experts (the PAF flag and senior officers, academic researchers and branch 
journalists). The empirical study was conducted in May 2011 and included in 
total 11 experts. The respondents were divided into two groups. The first one 
consisted of six senior officers of the Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support 
(and subordinate units) responsible for the outsourcing program implementation 
in the Polish Armed Forces. They covered the following functional areas: 
maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) of military equipment, car 
rental, movement and transportation, military infrastructure and facilities 
management, material supply (food, uniforms, petrol, oils and lubricants). They 
were asked about the lessons learned and the effects of the outsourcing program 
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implementation in the PAF. The second group numbering five experts (flag and 
senior officers, academic researchers and branch journalists) was expected to 
provide a more general picture of the process and assess the perspectives for its 
future development. Moreover, the outcomes of the author’s previous empirical 
research on the determinants of Polish defence companies’ strategies were 
found to be useful (Lis 2011) as well.
In order to define clearly the field of the research, some assumptions have 
been made. First of all, the paper focuses on military outsourcing in Poland. 
However, making efforts to build up the big picture, it refers to the research 
literature based on the American and West European perspectives. Nevertheless, 
in all cases the paper deals with the issues of military outsourcing in ‘efficient’, 
democratic states, omitting the challenges of security privatisation in weak 
states. The latter problem is discussed among other by Holmqvist (2005, 
p. 11-22). Secondly, the paper distinguishes a wide range of functional areas 
contracted out by ministries of defence, but in its empirical part it is limited 
to logistic support services outsourced by the Polish Armed Forces according 
to ministerial regulations in force. Thirdly, the aforementioned contracting-out 
program for the Polish Armed Forces gives particular attention to the in-place 
forces support, what affects the area of the paper’s interest.
The article is organised around four issues. The first part has the theoretical 
character and it provides the background for the following empirical study. It 
attempts to define military outsourcing and to identify its scope. The second 
part presents the development of military outsourcing market and the reasons 
standing behind its growth. The purpose of the third part is to find out the 
outcomes and lessons learned from military outsourcing implementation in 
the PAF. The fourth part of the paper is devoted to the prospects for military 
outsourcing development in Poland.
Finally, one linguistic comment should be made. Generally British English 
standard has been used to write and edit the text. However, in some cases while 
referring to or quoting American sources the original features of American 
English standard have been purposely kept unchanged. 
2. The nature and the scope of military outsourcing
Outsourcing is commonly understood as the “process of subcontracting 
services and operations to other firms that can perform them more cheaply 
or better” (Griffin 2008, p. 599). As Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008, p. 3-4) 
observe “[o]utsourcing means the transfer of management, functions or 
services to an external service provider through a contractual arrangement, 
whether between private companies or from the public to the private sector”. 
Outlining the background for military outsourcing, Skarżyński (2008, p. 168-
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169) introduces two different classifications of outsourcing: the object typology 
covering different areas of outsourcing and the subject typology differentiating 
between beneficiaries of outsourcing. The object typology encompasses the 
outsourcing of: transportation, storage, shipping, technology, accounting, debt 
collection, training, IT and others. The subject typology may include among 
others: business outsourcing, public administration and military outsourcing. 
Skarżyński (2008, p. 169) interprets military outsourcing as “the use of 
external resources and services by the institutions responsible for national 
defence [translation mine, AL]”. His understanding of military outsourcing 
is close to the definition proposed by Pan (2004) who describes military 
outsourcing as “[t]he process of contracting out to private companies tasks 
that used to be performed by the members of the uniformed military”. Perlo-
Freeman and Sköns (2008, p. 4) point out that “[o]utsourcing of military 
functions to private industry is (…) a part of a broader trend of privatisation 
in  military sector”. However, while analysing the nature of military services 
these researchers claim that “the key distinction is neither in the military or 
civilian identity of the customer, nor in the case of services, whether they 
were previously performed by uniformed personnel, but in the nature of the 
service – whether it is generic or military specific” (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns 
2008, p. 5). 
As Hartley (2004, p. 200) observes “[m]ilitary outsourcing has been the 
victim of various definitions. These include contracting-out, contractorisation, 
privatization, competitive tendering, market testing and the most recent 
initiatives in the form of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP)”. This ambiguity in terminology may be observed 
even in the official NATO and EU publications. Neither the NATO Glossary 
of Terms and Definitions AAP-6 (2010) nor the NATO Allied Joint Logistic 
Doctrine AJP-4(A) (2003) provides the definition of military outsourcing 
or even mentions it. Instead of outsourcing the AJP-4(A) (2003, point 0104) 
identifies the term ‘contracting’ and considers it as one of the functional areas 
of logistics[1].  The NATO doctrine highlights that “[c]ontracting has become 
increasingly important to the conduct of NATO operations, particularly in 
non-Article 5 CRO[2]. Contracting is a significant tool that may be employed 
to gain access to local resources, and other necessary materials and services”. 
(AJP-4(A) 2003, point 0323). Moreover, the AJP-4(A) (2003, point 0117c(9)) 
introduces the term Third Party Logistics Support Services (TPLSS) 
considered as “preplanned provision of selected logistic support services by 
a contractor” and states that “TPLSS can release scare resources for higher 
1 The other functional areas of logistics according to the AJP-4(A) are: supply and services, maintenance and repair, 
movement and transportation, infrastructure, medical, funding.
2 CRO – Crisis Response Operations.
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priority tasks elsewhere, overcome known logistic shortfalls and provide long-
term endurance and sustainability”. Similarly, the EU directive on contracting 
in defence sector (Directive 2009/81/EC) uses the term ‘contracting’, not even 
mentioning the word ‘outsourcing’. However, on the other hand the European 
Defence Agency’s analyses on military expenditures commonly identify 
financial means ‘outsourced’ by the armed forces (cf European – U.S. defence 
expenditures in 2009, p. 14; Defence Data of EDA participating Member States 
in 2009, p. 29-30).
Beside the ambiguity in defining military outsourcing, another debatable 
issue is the scope of outsourced services.  Analysing the employment of 
military outsourcing by the U.S. Armed Forces during the first phase of the 
Iraqi operation, Pan (2004) finds out that “[t]he assignments range[d] from 
mundane jobs like cooking or cleaning to specialized ones like maintaining 
and repairing sophisticated weapons systems, translating and transcribing, 
and interrogating Iraq prisoners”. Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) conducting the studies on military services extends their scope 
“from support services (e.g. logistics, communications, technical support) and 
consultancy services (e.g. operational support, training, intelligence) to the 
provision of frontline combat capacities”[3]. Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008, 
p. 6-7) identify the following types of military service provided by civilian 
contractors: research and development (R&D) of weapon systems, technical 
services (IT services, systems support, equipment maintenance, repair and 
overhaul – MRO), operational support (facilities management – FM, logistics, 
training, intelligence services, weapon destruction and disposal), armed forces 
services (armed security). Such an approach is close the classification of 
privatised military firms proposed by Singer (2003, quoted after Perlo-Freeman 
and Sköns 2008, p. 4) who divides them into: 
• military provider firms engaging in military operations,
• military consultant firms providing training and consultancy closely 
linked to the military operations,
• military support firms providing logistics.
As Petersohn (n.d., p. 6-7) finds, such an approach to classify private military 
companies (PMCs) according to the type of services they provide is widespread in 
the literature. Referring to the works of Kümmel (2004, p. 14) and Singer (2003, 
p. 91-92), he identifies: private combat companies, private security companies, 
private consultant companies and private logistical support companies. 
Comparing Petersohn’s classification to the typology proposed by Singer one 
should notice that the former distinguishes between private combat companies and 
private security companies while the latter places both aforementioned categories 
3 http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/trends/research_projects/psc (05.06.2011).
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under one header referring to them as ‘military provider firms’. In accordance 
with Petersohn’s classification, private combat companies are “involved in direct 
engagement of the enemy or else they command regular troops”, while private 
security companies “provide special personnel to guard facilities, convoys, and 
individuals” (Petersohn n.d., p. 6-7).
In order to provide a comprehensive picture of military outsourcing 
phenomenon, apart from defining it and identifying its scope, it is required to find 
the clear distinction between military outsourcing and outsourcing commonly 
used in a civilian environment. Depending on the differences in the way how 
military outsourcing is defined and classified, there are two approaches to 
establish the border line. The first one refers to the subject typology of outsourcing. 
According to this approach military outsourcing covers all the services contracted 
out by the armed forces on the civilian market, regardless of the fact whether 
the character of those services is military specific or civilian specific. Trying 
to justify the distinction between military outsourcing and services outsourced 
by other (civilian) customers, (Skarżyński 2008, p. 169) claims that military 
outsourcing is to be considered separately because: 
• the national defence sector requires not only resources and services 
commonly used and easy to get on the market but also some very 
specific ones;
• service providers are to meet strictly defined requirements based on the 
military regulations;
• services for the military sector are often provided in a different 
environment than those for the civilian customers.
The second approach refers to the object typology differentiating 
between outsourcing of military specific services and other types of services 
(i.e. transportation, facilities management, catering services) which can be 
acquired by both armed forces and civilian organisations. Perlo-Freeman and 
Sköns (2008, p. 5) defining the nature of military services claim that “the key 
distinction is neither in the military or civilian identity of the customer, nor 
in the case of services, whether they were previously performed by uniformed 
personnel, but in the nature of the service – whether it is generic or military 
specific”. However as they stress “[i]n practice, the distinction between 
military and non-military goods and services is difficult to draw”. Referring 
to Lindley-French and Algieri (2004, p. 68), Petersohn observes that “[t]he 
military capabilities necessary to produce security depend on the mission, 
the characteristics of the theater, and other factors. (…) Providing security at 
home is apparently a different task from providing it when deployed abroad” 
(Petersohn n.d., p. 9). In order to classify those capabilities, he uses a traditional 
military typology encompassing: combat functions, combat support (CS) 
functions and combat service support (CSS) functions. 
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The U.S. field manual Operational terms and graphics defines ‘combat 
functions’ as the “[f]unctions that commanders integrate and coordinate to 
synchronize battle effects in time, space, and purpose. They are intelligence, 
maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics and 
battle command” (FM 101-5-1 1997, p. 1-30). The U.S. Dictionary of military 
and associated terms introduces the term ‘operating forces’ denoting “[t]
hose forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the 
integral supporting elements thereof” (JP 1-02, 2001, p. 390). Forces directly 
participating in combat are called ‘combat forces” (JP 1-02, 2001, p. 98).  
According to the NATO glossary of terms and definitions and the U.S. 
Dictionary of military and associated terms ‘combat support’ (CS) is defined 
as the “fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements”[4] 
(AAP-6, 2010 p. 2-C-8; cf. JP 1-02 2001, p. 106). The term ‘combat service 
support’ (CSS) refers to “[t]he support provided to combat forces, primarily in 
the fields of administration and logistics” (AAP-6, 2010 p. 2-C-8). The combat 
service support covers “[t]he essential capabilities, functions, activities, and 
tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels 
of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but it is not 
limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of 
supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required 
by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their 
missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all 
levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield” 
(JP 1-02 2001, p. 106). Combat service support “also include those activities in 
stability and support operations that sustain all operating forces” (FM 101-5-1 
1997, p. 1-32)[5].  
Taking into consideration the aforementioned classification of military 
capabilities and functions, one may observe that both combat and combat support 
capabilities should be considered as pure, military specific functions. The status 
of combat service support capabilities is much more complex. One may claim 
that a lot of services provided within the frame of CSS are the logistic services 
of civilian nature (i.e. transportation, storage or catering services). To a certain 
extent, such a statement is true in reference to some of logistic services acquired 
by in-place forces deployed in their home garrisons in peacetime. However, in 
any operational setting such a distinction between military specific functions 
and civilian specific functions used to sustain military troops is doubtful. There 
4 For example, in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps combat support includes the following branches and functions: 
“Chemical Corps, civil affairs, psychological operations, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps, and the 
Signal Corps” (FM 101-5-1 1997, p. 1-32).
5 For example in the United States, “[t]he included branches and functions are: Adjutant General Corps, Acquisition 
Corps, Chaplain Corps, Finance Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, Medical Corps, Ordnance Corps, 
Transportation Corps, and the Quartermaster Corps” (FM 101-5-1 1997, p. 1-32).
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are, at least three reasons to differentiate between military logistic services 
and civilian logistic services[6]. Firstly, in operations all the troops, including 
CSS units providing logistic services, may come under fire. Secondly, on the 
battlefield logistics may be considered as an element of “combat functions’ (cf. 
FM 101-5-1 1997, p. 1-30), crucial for the final result of the operation. Thirdly, 
there are some important differences between military and civilian logistics. 
Those differences are discussed by Ficoń (2009, p. 175-177). The gist of this 
comparative analysis is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Military and civilian logistics – a comparative analysis
Characteristics Military logistics Civilian logistics
Mission of logistics
Operational and combat 
security
Market competitiveness
Criterion of operations Security of supplies Minimisation of costs
Time factor Highest priority
According to the just-in-time 
principle
Level of stocks
Defined by military 
regulations
Minimal
Purchase of supplies Operational requirements Economic criteria
Distribution system
Adjusted to operational 
requirements
Wholesale/retail channels
Selection of suppliers
According to operational 
criteria 
According to market criteria
Outsourcing Limited scope Full scale
Warehouses Specialised Universal
Packaging Special Market
Planning input Operational plan Market forecast
Logistic services Very wide range Narrow range
Material supplies Very wide range
Range adjusted to the type of 
a company
Ecological requirements Second-rate importance First-rate importance
Just-in-time Full scale Full scale
Source: Ficoń K., Dwie wojny dwie logistyki, “Kwartalnik Bellona”, 2009, No. 1, p. 177. 
[translation mine, A.L.].
In order to summarise the discussion on the nature of military outsourcing, 
an attempt has been made to draw the distinction between military and civilian 
outsourcing. The graphical representation of this operation is presented in 
Figure 1.
6 Operational logistic support includes the following functional areas: supply and services, maintenance and repair, 
movement and transportation, infrastructure, medical support, contracting, funding. AJP-4(A), point 0104.
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 Figure 1. The scope of military outsourcing
Source: Own study.
3. The development of the military outsourcing market
The military transformation undertaken by the armed forces in 
democratic states in the 1990s and 2000s resulted in the increase of the 
military outsourcing market. Referring to the works of Singer (2003) and 
Wulf (2005), Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008, p. 3) find that “[t]he current 
increase in the market for military services is the result of several trends 
during recent decades that affect both demand (the use of private companies 
for the provision of military services) and supply (the increase in private 
companies engaged in the sale of military services)”. They list the following 
factors standing behind the growth of the military services market (Perlo-
Freeman and Sköns 2008, p. 3-4; cf. Holmqvist 2005, p. 2):
• the decrease in military expenditures and the number of military 
personnel,
• the increase in demand for private military services due to: the changing 
nature of armed conflicts, the growing role of expeditionary operations, 
‘revolution in military affairs’ (military technology) and the loss of the 
expertise in some areas by the armed forces,
• the growing acceptance of privatisation and outsourcing of public 
activities.
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The United States of America is the unquestionable world leader in 
contracting services out by the military sector. In Europe, the concept of military 
outsourcing is mostly widespread in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the two 
aforementioned nations are the cases of numerous analyses and publications, 
attracting the attention of both American and international  researchers. For 
example, the outsourcing in the U.S. Army is widely discussed by Nigara (2004) 
in her dissertation for doctorate in management. The consequences and risks 
of using military outsourcing, and private military companies in particular, 
are a very debatable issue catching a lot of researchers’ attention. The works 
by Markusen (2003), Holmqvist (2005), Schreier and Caparini (2005), Perlo-
Freeman and Sköns (2008), Petersohn (n.d.) are only a few examples. The problem 
will be studied in detail in the further part of the paper. Apart from the economic 
point of view, military outsourcing is examined from military, political and legal 
perspectives. Once can notice, that in the United States, the issues of military 
outsourcing are eagerly explored by American and foreign military service people 
doing their research projects in military academies (i.e. Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, United States Army War College) and often published in 
military journals (i.e. a quarterly “Parameters” published by the United States 
Army War College). The role of civilian contractors in the support of the U.S. 
Armed Forces is the area of exploration for Polish academicians, too (cf. Jałowiec 
2009, p. 179-183). Next, the UK policy on military outsourcing is presented by 
Hartley (2004, p. 202-205). Among Polish researchers, Jałowiec identifies British 
lessons learned from the process of military outsourcing implementation (2010, 
p. 62-65). A comprehensive analysis of the UK market for military outsourcing 
contracts is provided by MacDonald (2010, p. 115-132). Moreover, the latter makes 
the wide review of the literature on military outsourcing including theoretical 
approaches and empirical literature (MacDonald 2010, p. 25-59). 
The significance of military outsourcing for the support of the armed forces 
in the United States and the United Kingdom can be expressed by the level of the 
‘outsourced’ military expenditures. In the United States, outsourcing spending 
makes almost one fourth of total military expenditures. What is more, the value 
and the share of the outsourcing spending has been increasing in recent years. 
In 2007, the U.S. Armed Forced outsourced  services for 76,2 bln[7] euro (17% 
of total military expenditures). In 2008, this value reached the level of 99,4 bln 
euro (21%) and in 2009 it peaked up to 112,5 bln euro (23% of total military 
expenditures). In the same period of time, the military outsourcing expenditures 
in the European Defence Agency[8] member states remained at the level of 6 to 
7 In this paper, the word ‘billion’ refers to the modern (short scale) English usage. One billion denotes one thousand 
million (109).
8 The European Defence Agency numbers 26 participating member states (all the European Union member states with 
the exception of Denmark).
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7% of total military expenditures (2007 – 14,4 bln euro, 2008 – 12 bln euro, 
2009 – 14,1 bln euro). (European – U.S. defence expenditures in 2009, p. 14). 
The lion’s share of this amount (around two thirds) is the military expenditure 
outsourced by the United Kingdom (9 bln euro as of 2009) (Defence Data of 
EDA pMS in 2009, p. 29).
Using the case of the United States as the base for their analyses, Apgar and 
Keane (2004, p. 46-55) propose a comprehensive model of military outsourcing 
market. The model includes four segments: 
• customers: the military services, commands, agencies and other buyers;
• consumers: service members, their families, military retirees and 
civilians employed by the Department of Defence;
• suppliers: companies providing services to military customers and 
consumers;
• programs: mechanisms for outsourced activities management.
The graphical interpretation of the military outsourcing market model is 
presented in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2. The model of the military outsourcing market 
Source: Apgar IV M., Keane J.M., New business with the new military, “Harvard Business 
Review” 2004, September, p. 46.
In order to sum up the foregoing theoretical introduction and provide 
the framework for the empirical studies some assumptions have been made. 
First of all, the definition of ‘military outsourcing’ proposed by Skarżyński 
(2008, p. 169) (“the use of external resources and services by the institutions 
responsible for national defence”) will be in force for the purpose of this paper. 
In the author’s subjective view, the aforementioned denotation reflects in the 
best way how contemporary military outsourcing is understood in the Polish 
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Armed Forces. Secondly, it should be emphasised that beside the differences 
in defining military outsourcing, there are numerous terms of similar or the 
same meaning, what makes the confusion about terminology. The most popular 
among them are: contracting, contracting-out, Private Finance Initiative, Public 
Private Partnership or Third Party Logistics Support Services. Thirdly, in the 
countries which are the most advanced in using military outsourcing it usually 
encompasses armed forces services including engagement in combat operations, 
training services and logistic support. In Poland, so far military outsourcing 
is limited to widely understood logistic sector. Fourthly, military outsourcing 
sector has been growing in  the post Cold War reality (especially in the United 
States and the United Kingdom) and still has the potential for growth due to the 
trends affecting both demand and supply on the market of military services. 
Fifthly, the model of the military outsourcing market submitted by Apgar IV 
and Keane (2004, p. 46-55) will be applied for further discussion. The model 
consists of four elements: customers, consumers and suppliers and programs. 
The model, developed in the United States, seems to suit well to the Polish 
military outsourcing market, too.  
4. Military outsourcing in Poland – lessons learned 
Although the value and the scope of services outsourced by the Polish 
Armed Forces (PAF) is significantly lower in comparison with the United 
States or the United Kingdom, the role of military outsourcing in Poland has 
been growing since the beginning of the 1990s. The breakthrough in the Polish 
military outsourcing market came in 2008, when the Minister of National 
Defence officially approved the contracting-out program for the Polish Armed 
Forces. In his decision dated as of 3 July 2008, Bogdan Klich outlined the 
prospects for the further development of military outsourcing. According to this 
program, there are five potential fields for military outsourcing. They include: 
logistics, legal advisory services, administrative services, force protection and 
military infrastructure. Within logistics, the following areas are identified as 
the most promising for military outsourcing (Koncepcja 2008, p. 1031-1033, see 
also: Lis 2009, p. 260-261): 
• maintenance,  repairs and overhaul (MRO) of armaments and military 
equipment;
• rental of vehicles (passenger cars, trucks, medical vehicles) and other 
types of equipment;
• recycling of waste munitions, rocket propellants, chemicals, medical 
wastes and food wastes; 
• transportation: air, railway, sea;
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• storage of supplies: food, uniforms, petrol, oil and lubricants (POL), 
medicines;
• catering and laundry services.
The outsourcing of maintenance and repair services encompasses mainly 
the new types of equipment and the vehicles which are used both in the military 
and civilian environment. Among the examples MRO services which have been 
contracted-out the respondents participating in the survey mention: armoured 
personal carriers ROSOMAK, passenger cars or logistic vehicles.
Ciekot and Jałowiec (2010, p. 21-25) outline the main assumptions of the 
car rental outsourcing in the Polish Armed Forces. The program was launched 
by the Inspectorate for the Armed Forces Support (Inspektorat Wsparcia Sił 
Zbrojnych, IWsp SZ) in 2010 and it is planned to be implemented by 2018. The 
program consists of two stages. The first stage (2010-2013) is the experiment 
carried out in seven military units representing different armed services: Land 
Forces, Air Forces, Navy and military logistics. The experiment covers the 
outsourcing of heavy equipment transport systems (of loading capacity up to 
30 tonnes) and general purpose vehicles (passenger cars, buses and mini buses, 
trucks). If the experiment brings positive effects the vehicles rental is going to 
be expanded in all military units by 2018.
Movement and transportation (M&T) is another field of military logistics, 
where outsourcing plays a significant role. Poland’s accession to NATO resulted 
in the increase of the Polish Armed Forces’ engagement in allied military 
operations abroad. This trend determined the growing demand for the access 
to the strategic air and sea transportation capabilities. Contemporary, the 
requirements of the Polish Armed Forces for the strategic air transportation are 
satisfied by three types of capabilities: Polish military transportation aircrafts 
(C-295 CASA and C-130 Hercules), the multinational military Heavy Airlift 
Wing (HAW) operating within the frame of the Strategic Airlift Capability 
(SAC) program[9] and the outsourcing of air transportation services. As far 
as strategic sealift is concerned military outsourcing is the only solution[10]. 
In order to ensure the flexible access to the means of strategic air and sea 
transportation, the Polish National Movement Coordination Centre (NMCC) 
uses three types of outsourcing tools: the SALIS program, the AMSCC 
program and framework agreements. Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) 
is the consortium of sixteen NATO member countries, which “have pooled 
their resources to charter special aircraft that give the Alliance capability to 
transport heavy equipment across the globe by air. The multinational airlift 
9 More: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm (26.05.2011); http://www.heavyairliftwing.org 
(26.05.2011).
10 This is a world trend. Few nations own their own military transportation ships. Among NATO members, only four 
countries have such a capability (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark).
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consortium is chartering six Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft, which 
are capable of handling ‘outsize’ (unusually large) cargo”[11]. The contractor is 
a Russian-Ukrainian consortium Ruslan-Salis consisting of two companies: 
Volga Dnepr and Antonov Design Bureau. While SALIS provides the access to 
the strategic air transportation, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and 
Technical Arrangements (TA) signed between the Polish Armed Forces and the 
Athens Multinational Strategic Lift Coordination Center (AMSCC) facilitate 
the contracting of sealift services. The AMSCC provides a complex support 
during the contracting procedure conducted in accordance with the EU public 
procurement regulations[12]. The means of strategic transportation may be also 
acquired by the activation of framework agreements negotiated and signed in 
advance. Contemporary, there are two such framework agreements in-force 
which provide the PAF with the access to the ships and planes enabling the 
strategic transportation of equipment and personnel[13]. The interviewed experts 
list the contracting-out of strategic air and sea lift capabilities among the most 
successful examples of military outsourcing in the PAF. They highlight very 
positive economic and operational effects of the program. 
According to the assumptions of the MOD outsourcing program, catering 
services were considered as the area of possible outsourcing expansion. In 
2009, the experiment in catering outsourcing was launched in Wrocław. The 
key players of the experimental program were: the 2nd Military Support Unit 
(2. Wojskowy Oddział Gospodarczy, WOG) – the customer, military personnel 
of the Engineering and NBC Troops Training Centre (Centrum Szkolenia 
Wojsk Inżynieryjnych i Chemicznych) – consumers and the catering company 
PHU WIG – the supplier. There were plans to introduce outsourced catering 
in other military units. Although the first outcomes of the experiment were 
quite positive[14]  (see more: Politowski 2009, p. 18-20), finally the program 
was given up. The main reason standing behind this decision was the radical 
decrease in needs for catering services resulting from the professionalization of 
the PAF. In 2009, the military compulsory service was suspended. Professional 
military personnel are authorised to be fed free of charge only in particular 
circumstances (i.e. operations abroad, training longer than eight hours, duty 
services). In effect, the number of military dinning facilities’ customers 
decreased from 70,000 in 2009 to 20,000 in 2011. Therefore, radical changes 
were introduced within the military catering system. The Armed Forces closed 
down around 150 out of 300 dining facilities, offering some of them (around 
11 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm (26.05.2011).
12 http://www.stirw.wp.mil.pl/Programy/AMSCC.pdf (26.05.2011).
13 http://www.stirw.wp.mil.pl/Programy/UMOWY%20RAMOWE.pdf (01.06.2011).
14 Some experts participating in the study were much more skeptical about the effects of this experiment.
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50) to be rented by civilian contractors. Simultaneously, the Armed Forces want 
to keep up in-home the remaining military catering potential and capabilities. 
In such circumstances, the further plans for the outsourcing of catering services 
are limited to several military units of low number of consumers. Due to the 
aforementioned changes any projects to outsource the storage of food supplies 
were abandoned, too. 
The process of the armed forces professionalization reduced the military 
demand for laundry services as well. Professional troops receive financial bonus 
and take care of their laundry on their own. Military logistics is responsible for 
providing laundry services only for the personnel permanently accommodated 
in barracks: i.e. soldiers of the preparatory service basic training courses or 
cadets of military academies and schools. The gradual decline in demand 
accelerated by the professionalization processes, and the changes in the public 
finances legal regulations resulted in the close down of remaining seven 
military laundries at the end of the year 2010. Nowadays all laundry services 
are contracted by the military logistics on the local market.
The supply of petrol, oils and lubricants (POL) is another area of military 
outsourcing. Although the plans to outsource the storage capacities for 
POL products were postponed, the fleet fuelling program appeared to be 
unquestionable success. The program implemented initially in July 2009 in 
the logistic units subordinated to the Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support, 
one year later was extended to all military units of the Polish Armed Forces. 
The interviewed experts emphasise positive economic effects of the program 
and predict its further extension resulting, in some cases, in the close down of 
fuelling stations in the units devoid of heavy military equipment.
Beside logistics, the examples of  military outsourcing application include 
such areas as: legal advisory services, administrative services, force protection 
and military infrastructure. The suspension of the compulsory military service 
and the professionalization of the PAF have strengthened the role of contracting-
out in force protection and infrastructure. Nowadays, the force protection of 
military facilities is carried out by one of the following formations: military 
guards (military servicemen), civilian guards (civilian servants employed by 
military units) or outsourced force protection companies. The interviewed 
experts highlight very positive outcomes of force protection outsourcing. 
In their opinion, it enables military personnel to focus on core competencies 
such as training and operational tasks. Moreover, the respondents point out 
the economic effectiveness of force protection contracting-out. Nevertheless, 
they find as very positive the diversification of formations employed to protect 
military facilities. Such an approach allows to keep in-house force protection 
of the key military facilities and simultaneously to outsource the services for 
the rest of them. What is more, keeping some capabilities in-home enables their 
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extension in the case of crisis and increases the PAF bargaining power to the 
force protection outsourcing sector, preventing from the threat of unfounded 
rise of prices.
The contracting-out services by the military infrastructure has a long 
tradition. Since the 1989 breakthrough, the share of outsourced constructions 
works and military facilities maintenance services has been constantly growing. 
In 2010, the suspension of compulsory military service determined the extension 
of cleaning and outdoor areas maintenance outsourcing. Another factor 
stimulating the outsourcing of facilities management services is the reduction 
of employment in this area due to the organisational restructuring of the PAF 
aimed at the increasing the “tooth” (combat units) at the expense of the “tail” 
(support personnel). Beside facilities management, in recent years the lion’s 
share of construction works has been outsourced, too. Moreover, the changes in 
the public finances law determined the transformation of military (budgetary) 
construction enterprises (Wojskowe Zakłady Remontowo-Budowlane, WZRB) 
into subsidiary companies of the Military Housing Agency (Wojskowa Agencja 
Mieszkaniowa, WAM). In result, the Polish Armed Forces gave up any 
construction capabilities and nowadays relies totally on contracting-out.
The key motive behind the decision to outsource non-core capabilities 
is seeking the increase in effectiveness. The assumption is that external 
contractors will provide services of better quality and/or at a lower cost for the 
customer. What is more, Hartley claims that in ‘make or do’ decisions a simple 
analysis of technical efficiency (the lowest cost method of achieving a given 
output) is not sufficient. He recommends to employ a more complex allocative 
efficiency, which beside the technical efficiency takes into account margin 
social benefits and costs (Hartley 2004, p. 200). However, such an approach is 
much more challenging and demanding. Discussing the effectiveness of military 
outsourcing projects some researchers (i.e. Schreier and Caparini 2005, p. 98) 
raise the issues of transaction costs, which may in extreme cases outweigh 
financial savings achieved by the bidding procedure on the competitive market. 
These aforementioned transaction costs include the costs of negotiating and 
managing contracts.
Trying to assess the effectiveness of military outsourcing projects 
implemented in the PAF, the experts participating in the study highlight their 
positive economic effects (the decrease in costs). However, they pay special 
attention to the problems of the quality of services provided by some contractors. 
They find that precise description of the requirements for the outsourced services 
may be still a challenge for some less experienced contracting officers. The 
methodology of logistic services quality assessment, being currently worked 
out in the National Defence Academy, is mentioned as a potential tool to be 
employed in contracting procedures. Too short contract terms are another factor 
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harmfully affecting the cost effectiveness of outsourcing projects. Nowadays 
the most of them are one-year contracts (up to 90% of all outsourcing contracts 
according to the estimation of some experts participating in the study). The 
experts highlight that the lengthening of contract terms could result in lower 
costs and would make military bids more attractive for potential providers.
The attention of the second part of the paper has been focused on the 
outcomes and lessons learned from the implementation of the contracting-out 
program by the Polish Armed Forces. The key areas of the military outsourcing 
(logistics, military infrastructure and force protection) have been discussed. 
The special attention has been paid to outsourcing of logistic capabilities such 
as: maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) of armaments and military 
equipment; vehicle rental, movement and transportation, catering and laundry 
services. Moreover, an attempt has been made to assess (ex post) the effects of 
military outsourcing projects.
5. Prospects for the development of military outsourcing in 
Poland
The study on the prospects for the further development of military 
outsourcing in Poland has been focused on three key issues: the identification 
of opportunities and threats for the Polish Armed Forces resulting from 
outsourcing their in-home capabilities; the opportunities and barriers for 
the growth of the military outsourcing market in Poland and finally experts’ 
recommendations for customers and suppliers aimed at the improvement of 
military outsourcing projects and their management.
According the opinion of the interviewed experts, the key opportunities for 
the Polish Armed Forces resulting from the increase in the number and value of 
outsourced services are:
• focusing on core competencies (training, military operations);
• increasing the quality of non-core services provided by experienced 
external suppliers;
• increasing the number and strengthening the “tooth” (combat troops) at 
the expense of the “tail” (support personnel);
• rationalising costs of services and, in effect, decreasing the level of 
military expenditures or saving financial resources to be allocated in 
other areas.
Nevertheless, one should not forget to consider the risks connected with 
outsourcing capabilities by the armed forces. The respondents identify the 
following potential threats for the Polish Armed Forces: 
• loosing capabilities which are non-core businesses in the peace time, but 
might be critical and difficult to acquire from external sources during 
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crisis or war (drawing the line between ‘make or buy’ is a pending 
issue);
• loosing capabilities to monitor the quality of services provided by 
external suppliers,
• reducing the customer’s bargaining power towards contractors, in an 
extreme case making the PAF totally dependent on external contractors 
as an effect of complete outsourcing of a given capability;
• monopolisation and monopsonisation of the military outsourcing 
market including all their inefficiencies and negative consequences 
both for customers and suppliers, 
• the increase in transaction costs (the costs of managing projects) 
levelling positive effects of economic gains from contracting services 
on the competitive market,
• the risk of corruption and unethical behaviours.
The analysis highlights the similarity between the aforementioned factors 
typical of the Polish Armed Forces and the opportunities and threats resulting 
from contracting-out services by the armed forces abroad identified in the 
secondary sources. It should be stated that contemporary studies provide 
a wide range of such researches. Some of them are the effects of benchmarking 
analyses in the civilian service outsourcing industry, the others are based on 
the empirical surveys among the world leaders of military outsourcing (the 
United States and the United Kingdom in particular). Referring to Tondorff 
(1998, p. 70-71) and Abt (2000, p. 193-194) Skarżyński translates the 
opportunities and threats of outsourcing projects identified on the civilian 
market into military environment (Skarżyński 2008, p. 169-170). Numerous 
positive effects of outsourcing military support functions in the United States 
and the United Kingdom are listed by Apgar IV and Keane (2004,  p. 48-
55). An interesting overview of problems, challenges and lessons learned 
from military outsourcing programs in the United Kingdom is presented by 
Hartley (2004, p. 200-205). His study, in comparison to the results of the 
experts interviews or Skarzyński’s findings, puts more emphasis on military 
outsourcing in combat missions. A long list of potential risks involved in 
military outsourcing is provided by Schreier and Caparini. They put the 
emphasis on the notions of transaction costs, monitoring outsourcing projects, 
the risk of monopolisation with its inefficiencies, political consequences and 
the lack of transparency (Schreier and Caparini 2005, p. 97-102). Referring 
to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports [15], Perlo-
15 DOD’s extensive use of logistics support contracts requires strengthened oversight, GAO-04-854, US Government 
Accountability Office, Washington, DC, July 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf; High-level DOD 
action needed to address long-standing problems with management and oversight of contractors supporting 
deployed forces, GAO-07-145, US Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, Dec 2006; http://www.gao/
new.items/d07145.pdf.
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Freeman and Sköns provide strong evidence to support the aforementioned 
concerns. They point out that GAO “has conducted a number of studies on the 
performance of logistics contracts in Iraq (…) and elsewhere and has found 
serious deficiencies in the planning, monitoring and oversight of the contract 
in Iraq”. (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns 2008, p. 15). In addition to purely 
economic and management challenges of military outsourcing which are 
typical of any kind of services outsourced by the armed forces, political, legal 
and operational consequences of armed security services provided by Private 
Military Companies (PMCs) on the battlefield are hot and debatable issues. 
Blackwater operations in Iraq are the best case to illustrate these concerns. 
Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008, p. 13-14) widely discuss the ramifications of 
the private military services growth: privatisation of the violence, problematic 
legal status of armed contractors, PMCs’ interest in the perpetuation of 
conflicts and the security of supply. Summing up the ongoing discussion 
on the positives and negatives of military outsourcing, one may find three 
conclusions. First of all, in spite of some negative examples, the vast majority 
of promising outsourcing cases are the logistic support projects. Secondly, 
as Perlo-Freeman and Sköns accurately observe (2008, p. 16) “the efficiency 
of outsourcing is likely to vary with the extent to which the key conditions – 
competition, clarity of requirement and effective monitoring – are present”. 
Thirdly, armed security contractors operating on the battlefield constitute 
the most controversial segment of the military outsourcing market arousing 
political, legal and operational concerns. 
In February and March 2011, Lis (2011) conducted the empirical research 
on the future determinants of Polish defence companies’ strategies. Experts 
(representing defence companies management, the Ministry of National 
Defence, academic researchers and branch journalists) were interviewed to 
assess the probability and the impact of forecasted determinants (of economic, 
technological, social, legal and regulatory, and international origin) on the 
situation of Polish defence companies in the future. The list of potential 
determinants included, among other factors, the prospects for the development 
of the Polish military outsourcing market. According to the opinions of the 
respondents, the chance that the Polish military outsourcing market will grow 
is estimated at 42%. They forecast 40% probability of the trend stabilisation 
and only 18% probability of the market shrinking. The experts participating in 
the panel focused on military outsourcing point out the following areas as the 
potential candidates for the growth of contracting-out:
a) in-place logistic support:
• military facilities management (including cleaning services, the 
maintenance of outdoor areas, repairs and construction works);
• force protection;
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• maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) of up-to-date military 
equipment and general purpose vehicles;
• medical services;
b) military operations abroad:
• military facilities management;
• maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) of up-to-date military 
equipment;
• material supply (including food, petrol, oil and lubricants);
• transportation: both strategic (mainly sea and air) and the movement 
on the theatre.
The data and opinions collected by interviewing experts enable to develop 
future scenarios for the Polish domestic military outsourcing market. The most 
likely scenario encompasses two parallel paths: 
• centralised contracts for MRO of military equipment carried out 
by armament producers (included into bidding procedures for the 
product delivery and life cycle support) or former state owned military 
maintenance companies (WPRP) planned to be incorporated into 
Bumar capital group as a service division;
• and decentralised contracts for logistic support awarded locally in 
garrisons by military support units or regionally by one of four regional 
logistic bases. It is forecasted that this segment will be served by local, 
regional or national outsourcing companies operating mainly on the 
civilian market. Some contracts may be as well awarded to international 
suppliers.
Thereby, two other scenarios taken into consideration – the monopolisation 
of the market by any of world leading military outsourcing operators or the 
emergence of a powerful Polish company specialized in military outsourcing – 
seem not to be very likely. The experts highlight that, beside the support for the 
in-place forces, military outsourcing is very likely to be employed in military 
operation abroad. In such a case, in the most likely scenario the Polish military 
contingent will join the logistic support system organised by a leading nation and 
will outsource services to the contractor operating in the area of operation. In 
order to complete the picture emerging from the aforementioned study, the experts 
participating in the survey on the military outsourcing were asked to identify the 
potential opportunities in the environment of the Polish military outsourcing 
market and barriers for its development. The list of opportunities includes:
• the worldwide trend (both in civilian and military logistics) to replace 
non-core in-house capabilities by contracting them out;
• the increasing level of specialisation in service industry, what makes 
almost impossible for any efficient and effective organisation to keep 
all capabilities in-home,
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• the professionalization process of the Polish Armed Forces and the 
tendency to increase the share of the ‘tooth’ (combat troops) at the 
expense of the ‘tail’ (support personnel) in order to augment operational 
capabilities;
• the increase in Poland’s military expenditures (MILEX) and expected 
changes in the MILEX structure (the decreasing share of personnel 
costs to the advantage of operation and maintenance (O&M) costs as 
well as investment expenditures);
• the ongoing transformation of the Polish military in-place logistic 
system aimed at the logistics’ consolidation in four regional military 
bases (Regionalna Baza Logistyczna, RBLog.) and the incorporation of 
military infrastructure to the logistic system (more: Szymański 2011; 
Klecha and Lis 2011).
The catalogue of aforementioned opportunities provides an optimistic view. 
However, on closer examination, it is corrupted by the long list of barriers in the 
development of the Polish military outsourcing market, which includes:
a) external barriers:
• very turbulent legal environment;
• too short financial perspective of outsourcing programs (insufficient 
number of long-term contracts);
• insufficient application of Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
programs;
• bureaucratic regulations on the military personnel’s relations with 
contractors on one hand and the risk of corruption on the other 
hand;
• ongoing organisational restructuring of the PAF resulting in 
frequent changes of military plans, structures and needs for 
outsourced services;
• mentality of some operational commanders attached to relying on 
in-house capabilities and their resistance to change;
b) internal barriers:
• fragmentation of the Polish outsourcing sector, the lack of Polish 
companies ready to provide comprehensive outsourcing project 
encompassing different areas;
• accidental unreliability and dishonesty of some contractors, what 
undermines customers’ trust  to the outsourcing sector;
• harvest strategies implemented by some service providers willing to 
exploit a single occasion instead of developing long term business 
relations, what strengthens military commanders’ prejudice against 
outsourcing.
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Last but not least, the aim of the study was to identify the customer’s (the 
PAF) and consumers’ expectations concerning outsourcing suppliers and the 
experts’ recommendations for military decision makers to increase the scope 
of the services contracted-out by the PAF and to improve the efficiency of 
outsourcing projects. The experts suggest that in order meet the customer’s 
and consumers’ requirements and expectations the suppliers should:
• be highly specialised companies, preferable the leaders in their 
branches;
• know the specific requirements and determinants of military 
customers;
• be customer-oriented companies seeking the balance between the 
profit maximisation and the needs and interests of their military 
customers;
• be able to provide the PAF with the services of higher quality and 
cheaper (or at least reasonable) price in comparison with military in-
home capabilities;
• develop partnership and long term relations with military customers 
and consumers,
• take care of their reliability and reputation. 
Nevertheless, on the customer’s side there is room for improvement, 
too. In order to make outsourcing projects more efficient and effective, the 
respondents recommend to:  
• change the approach to the acquisition of military equipment 
(reorientation to product life cycle management including servicing 
and recycling not only purchasing of the product);
• increase the number of long-term projects (longer than one year);
• put more emphasis on preparing and monitoring contracts in order to 
ensure that services provided by external suppliers meet the needs of 
consumers and the requirements specified in bidding documentation;
• strengthen the structures and capabilities of military logistics with 
highly skilled personnel experienced in managing outsourcing 
projects and contracting procedures;
• develop the tools to assess the effectiveness of outsourcing projects 
including costs analysis, norms, standards and the project quality 
measurement;
• benchmark and learn from the civilian logistic industry’s and other 
NATO countries’ (especially the USA, the UK, Germany) experience 
in military outsourcing.
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6. Conclusion
The paper has focused on four issues. First of all, military outsourcing has 
been defined and its scope has been identified. Secondly, the development of 
military outsourcing market and the causes for its growth in last two decades 
have been analysed. Then, the implementation of contracting-out program in 
the Polish Armed Forces, its outcomes and lessons learned have been outlined. 
Finally, the prospects for military outsourcing development in Poland have been 
discussed.
Summing up, some general conclusions should be mentioned. Military 
outsourcing is understood as the process of contracting out, by the armed forces, 
the services which earlier were their in-home capabilities. In recent twenty 
years, military outsourcing has been increasing its role in the support of the 
military sector. This trend is particularly prominent in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. In Poland, the development of military outsourcing market 
has been strengthened by three factors: the engagement of the Polish Armed 
Forces in military operations abroad, the professionalization process and the 
transformation of the military logistics system. In 2008, the MOD officially 
approved the program aimed the increasing the role of contracting-out in the 
support of the Polish Armed Forces. According to the program the potential 
areas for military outsourcing development include: logistics, legal advisory 
services, administrative services, force protection and military infrastructure. 
As opposed to the United States, in Poland military outsourcing in limited to 
the logistic support services, while armed security services and training linked 
to military operations remain military in-home capabilities. Looking forward, 
outsourcing-driven opportunities and threats for the Polish Armed Forces have 
been identified and the prospects for the domestic military outsourcing market 
have been discussed. Finally, some recommendations for suppliers and military 
decision makers have been articulated. The main conclusion is that the Polish 
military outsourcing market has expanded in recent years and there is still room 
for its further growth, especially in the area of military logistics.
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